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COMMENTS
CONTRACTS-IPORTATION OF CONSIDERATION FROM
ORIGINAL AGREEMENT
The nodification of a contract is an alteration in the legal re-
lationships existing between the parties thereto, wherein the basic, and
hence generalized, structure of rights and duties is preserved.' The
change is brought about by acts of the contracting parties which have
as immediate (proximate) ends the establishment of new and the
extinguishment of old, legal and social relationships.2
The typical situation which induces one or more of the parties to
a contract to seek a modification is a state of affairs wherein it is felt
that the results envisaged by the contract are either insufficient or frus-
trating for the furtherance of interests to which the contract is related.
Orders for manufactured goods are constantly being modified by
change in specifications as the need arises. Such a situation leads to
an attempt on the part of either one or both of the contracting parties
to secure from the other a change in the content of the original agree-
ment (redefinition of rights and/or duties), in order to bring about
results which would not flow from the performance of the contract as
it stood. Following the modification, the conduct of the parties is re-
oriented in terms of the new agreement, and the desired outcome is the
normal result. Concomitantly, there is a change in legal relationships,
which allows the parties to seek legal redress in the event of non-ful-
fillment of the modification contract.
1 "As far as legal terminology is concerned, there is of course a strict and
recognized distinction between contracts which modify and those which re-
place. The definition of modification is an alteration which introduces new
elements into the details, or cancels some of them, but leaves the general pur-
pose and effect of the subject matter intact, while substitution is defined as
something placed in a position previously occupied by another thing and con-
veys the idea of complete replacement. In practice, however, the distinction
is much vaguer, and it is submitted, is more one of degree than of principle,
modification embracing relatively slight changes, and substitution requiring
fundamental changes." 158 A.L.R. 231.
2"The meaning of a social relationship may be agreed upon by mutual consent.
This implies that the parties make promises covering their future behaviour,
whether toward each other or toward third persons. In such cases each
party then normally counts, so far as he acts rationally, in some degree on
the fact that the other will orient his action to the meaning of the agreement
as he (the first actor) understands it. In part, they orient their action ra-
tionally to these expectations as given facts with, to be sure, varying degrees
of subjectively 'loyal' intention of doing their part. But in part also they are
motivated each by the value to him of his 'duty' to adhere to the agreement
in the sense in which he understands it." Parsons, Max Weber- The Theory
of Social and Economic Organization, p. 120. Refer to p. 118 for Weber's
definition of "social relationship."
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Should the parties to a contract which is partly executory on both
sides wish to modify it, they could adopt one of several alternative
methods for meeting the requirement of consideration, which is gener-
ally held applicable to modification contracts.3 The legal duties imposed
by the old contract could be changed with respect to both parties in
such fashion that if the duties of one party should be solely reduced,
the duties for the other party would be either changed or reduced, and
should the duties of one party be solely increased, i.e., obviously in-
creased without other compensating changes, the duties for the other
party would be either changed or increased. Another method, which
is rather a circumvention than a meeting of the requirement for con-
sideration (but the legal effect is the same), is the explicit rescission of
the old contract, and the formation of a new one containing provisions
corresponding to the provisions of the old contract as modified. In the
latter case, the duties on the part of one of the parties might be altered,
increased or decreased without change of the duties of the other, and
the contract would still be enforceable. 4
What purpose can be served by the law in requiring the formalities
of the latter technique of rescission and formation of a totally distinct
contract for effectuating a change in contractual duties of one party
alone?5 Why should failure to meet those formalities be allowed to
strike down "one-sided modification agreements entered into in good
faith by laymen having no knowledge nor inclination to use that for-
mal modification procedure? The fact situations surrounding the modi-
fication procured by a modification contract and that procured by re-
scission of the old contract and formation of the new are so similar
that one would expect the law to attach similar legal consequences to
them, i.e., deem the legal relationships resulting from the acts engaged
in to procure the modification to be the same. In both cases the parties
seek to achieve the same goals and identical changes in legal duties.6
3 Page, The Law of Contracts (Cincinnati, 1920), §2461.
4 Grismore, Principles of the Law of Contracts, §67
5 "For it is absurd-save for certainty of intent-that a document reciting a
rescission and recontracting should be able to accomplish what absence of this
meaningless form of an intervening "rescission" may jeopardize." Llewellyn,
"Common-Law Reform of Consideration. Are there Measures?," 41 COL. L.
Ra,. 863 (1941).
6 Modification contracts operate primarily to vary the terms of a previous agree-
ment, terms which the parties were free to decide upon when no binding ob-
ligations existed. Before entrance into the contractual relationship, both par-
ties were vested with a great deal of freedom with regard to the selection of
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Assuming though, that the doctrine of consideration should be ap-
plicable to modification situations,7 because of sound policy considera-
tions embodied in it,8 the result would not be any different from its
non-application, if the pre-existing duty rule, with its logical fallacies,
were not allowed to control.9 Actually, an application of the definition
terms. The conditions which gave rise to that freedom are still to a great
extent present when the contract is partially executory on both sides. At such
a stage of the contract, the agreement must be regarded as very much alive.
The conditions which permitted freedom with respect to the selection of the
content of the contract still being present to a great extent while the contract
is executory, the freedom also should be present. In that fashion, the con-
tract will be allowed to more fully perform its function of providing "a
framework for well nigh every type of passing or permanent relation
between individuals and groups -a framework highly adjustable, a frame-
work which almost never accurately indicates real working relations, but
which affords a rough indication around which such relations vary, an occa-
sional guide in cases of doubt, and a norm of ultimate appeal when the re-
lations cease in fact to work." Llewellyn, "Contracts," Encyclopaedia of the
Social Sciences, p. 336.
7Llewellyn takes the opposite position. "Even if revocability up to the last
second were sane law for initiation of other than a business-gamble type of
deal, such revocability makes nonsense when applied to readjustment, as be-
tween two parties already launched into that distinct semi-joint venture going
relation known as 'Contract.' There is a type of good faith called for inside
the contractual scheme. , the arm's length stage is over when the deal has
been closed, the parties are thereafter working out a team play." Llewellyn,
"Common-Law Reform of Consideration," p. 873.
s The doctrine of consideration is criticized by many present day authorities.
Roscoe Pound offers a substitute. "Because men are prone to overmuch talk
it does not follow that promise made by businessmen in business dealings and
by others as business transactions are in any wise likely to proceed from
ostentation or that we should hesitate to make them as binding in law as they
are in business morals. Without accepting the will theory, may we not take a
suggestion from it and enforce those promises which a reasonable man in
the position of the promisee would believe to have been made deliberately
with intent to assume a binding relation." Pound, Introduction to the Phil-
osophy of Law, P 281.
9 "It is said that the obligor does only what he is legally bound to do. But the
confusion arises from a failure to distinguish between legal and moral ob-
ligations. One may be morally bound to do precisely in terms as he agrees;
but he is legally bound to do as a practical matter,-whatever the theory may
be, only what he can be compelled to do. The law does not prohibit his breach
of his contract, but leaves him free to break it if he chooses, giving the other
party the remedy of damages." Frye v. Hubbell, 74 N.H. 538, 68 Atl. 325
(1907), 17 L.R.A., (N.S.) 1197 "The only universal consequence of a legally
binding promise is, that the law makes the promisor pay damages if the
promised event does not come to pass. In every case it leaves him free from
interference until the time for fulfillment has gone by." Holmes, The Common
Law, p. 301. See, Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, p. 45, for the
statement that rules of law are "norms in which a certain sanction is made
dependent upon certain conditions."
19501
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
of consideration 0 to the facts of a typical "one-sided" modification
agreement will disclose consideration."
The promise to do that which one is already under a duty to per-
form in form is similar to that which defined the original undertaking.
But the collocation of words constituting the verbal manifestation of the
original promise, while remaining the same, takes on a new meaning
when it is made to secure additional compensation or reduction in duties.
The circumstances in which the new promise is made, differing from
those of the old promise, effect the change in the content of the words
used to manifest the previous promise. The attitude assumed with
reference to future performance by the promisor made under the new
conditions, is different from that originally assumed. This follows from
the fact that the orientation of the individual is made with respect to a
new fact situation which in part defines the attitude involved. The
promisor, after an assessment of the new facts, again directs himself
toward performance of his contractual duties. Assuming the new prom-
ise to have been made in good faith, the foreseeability of performance
is tremendously enhanced. This new dedication to performance, with
its assurance of the completion of the contractual obligations because of
the new mental state of the promisor, is the consideration which is
bargained for by the other party to the modification agreement.
In Wisconsin it is not necessary for those with the knowledge of
the means of circumventing the requirement of consideration for mod-
ification contracts, by rescission and new formation, to resort to that
highly formal process to accomplish their purposes. Those without
such knowledge or the inclination to use it who enter into modification
agreements in which the element of consideration (as conventionally
conceived) is absent, find their expectations induced by such agreement
fulfilled under Wisconsin law The rule that the consideration from
10 If consideration be regarded as a component of the fact situation from which
a legal relationship of contract is deemed to result, then its definition must
have referenc to factual subject matter. Consideration may be defined as
those acts of an individual which are bargained for and given in exchange for
a promise. Such a definition envisages the resultants of the acts, but focusses
attention on the more important feature, namely, the intervention of a human
actor to alter the normal course of events. Promises fall within the definition
for they are the assumption of an attitude by the promisor that a certain
composite of future events will ensue through his intervention or that he will
bear responsibility for their non-occurrence. "'The essence of a promise is that
it asserts the power of the speaker's mind over the future." Gardner, "An
Inquiry into the Principles of the Law of Contracts," 46 HAav. L. REv. 1
(1932).
11 "The rules which hold that a promise of additional compensation is without
consideration, if the promisor does or promises to do only that which he is
already under a contract obligation to do, cannot be satisfactorily rested upon
the ground that the promise has suffered no detriment and the promisor has
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the old contract is deemed imported into the new agreement 2 leads to
the enforcement of the modification agreement regardless of the me-
chanics of its formation.
Along with the abolition of the doctrine of consideration in the
field of contract modification, is the elimination of the pre-existing duty
rule from the same area.'" Even though the modification agreement
takes the form of one party again promising to do what he was already
bound to do under the original agreement in exchange for an alteration
in the duties (increase or change) of the other party or the reduction
or change of his own duties, the agreement is enforceable. Should the
parties to a contract which is partially executory on both sides regard
it as expedient to bring about a change in the duties of one of the
parties alone, an agreement to that effect is valid, and serves to modify
the original contract with reference to which it was made.
"We take it to be well settled that the parties to a contract may,
by mutual agreement (italics author's own), vary or modify its
received no benefit, nor upon the ground that the promisee has no right to take
any other course of action than to perform. In fact, no satisfactory solution
of the problem can be reached upon the basis of denying that there can be
under any circumstances consideration for a promise of additional compensa-
tion in such a case, but the circumstances of the particular case, or at least
of the class of cases under consideration, must be considered." Blakeslee et al
v. Board of Water Com'rs of City of Hartford, 106 Conn. 642, 139 Atl. 106,
55 A.L.R. 1319 (1927).
12The rule was necessary for decision and consideration in the conventional sense
was absent in the following Wisconsin cases: Brown v. Everhard, 52 Wis.
205, 8 N.W 725 (1881), Ruege v. Gates, 71 Wis. 634, 38 N.W 181 (1888),
Wis. Sulfite Fibre Co. v. Jeffris Lumber Co., 132 Wis. 1, 111 N.W. 237 (1907),
Foley v. Marsch, 162 Wis. 25, 154 N.W. 982 (1916), Murray v. Hamilton
Beach Manuf. Co., 178 Wis. 624, 190 N.W 460 (1922), Mollet v. Bloedorn,
226 Wis. 83, 275 N.W 896 (1937). The rule was necessary for decision, but
consideration in the conventional sense was present in the following cases:
Buechel v. Buechel, 65 Wis. 532, 27 N.W 318 (1886), Lynch v. Henry, 75 Wis.
631, 44 N.W 837 (1890), Montgomery v. American Central Ins. Co., 108 Wis.
146, 84 N.W 175 (1900), Holly v. First Nat. Bank of Kenosha, 218 Wis. 259
260 N.W 429 (1935). The rule was not necessary for decision in the follow-
ing cases: Miller Saw-Trimmer Co. v. Cheshire, 172 Wis. 278, 178 N.W 855
(1920), Miller v. Stanish, 202 Wis. 539, 230 N.W 47 (1930). The rule was
improperly applied or extended in the following cases: Kelly v. Bliss, 54 Wis.
187, 11 N.W 488 (1882) (agreement for rescission), Snell v. Bray, 56 Wis.
156, 14 N.W 14 (1882) (substitution agreement). The rule, by dicta, was held
applicable in suits for specific performance. "A subsequent contact between
the same parties, which was executed for the purpose of carrying out the
original intention of the parties to the preceding contract, is based on the
consideration for the original contract, so that specific performance will not
be refused. " Miller Saw-Trimmer Co., p. 279. The District Court for the
* Western District of Wisconsin applied the rule in Jacobs v. J. C. Penny Co.,
74 F Supp.440 (1947). The most precise statement of the rule is made in Brown
v. Everhard, p. 207 "The same consideration which existed for the old agree-
ment, is imported into the new agreement which is substituted for it."




terms without any new consideration therefor. In the case
of a modification or change of a contract, the consideration is
deemed imported into the new agreement which is substituted
for it.""4
An important limitation is placed upon the operation of that rule,
which could readily be supposed in light of the rationale given for
abolishing the requirement of consideration for modification agree-
ments, the contract sought to be modified must be partially executory
on both sides.
"A wholly executory contract for sale may be modified without
a new consideration, the consideration of the new contract being
deemed sufficient. If, however, the contract is complete or ex-
ecuted by one party, and modification thereof must be supported
by a new consideration."' 15
In addition, the modification must occur before breach,16 or the rules
governing accord and satisfaction become applicable.
Within the scope of operation of the rule regarding consideration
for modification contracts are those cases wherein one of the parties
threatens not to perform his obligations under the original agreement
unless increased compensation is promised. 7 This type of case brings
to the forefront the possibility of undue pressure being brought by
one of the parties to change his contractual duties without the exchange
of a benefit. In the typical case, the promisor's agreement of increased
compensation should be enforced, since his assessment of the facts led
him to regard as expedient the entrance into a modification contract.
Should peculiar circumstances alter the equities of the case, it would
be the function of other legal doctrines to vary the result dictated by
the general rule.'8
14 Kelley v. Bliss, 54 Wis. 187, 11 N.W 488 (1882).(1882).
25 Murray v. Hamilton Beach Manuf. Co., 178 Wis. 624, 190 N.W 460 (1922).
16 Bowman v. Wright, 65 Neb. 661, 91 N.W 580 (1902). The modification must
also have reference to a pre-existing valid contract. Skhogasky v. Ray Worth,
139 Wis. 115, 120 N.W 822 (1909).
17 Foley v. Marsch, 162 Wis. 25, 154 N.W 982 (1916), Mollet v. Bloedorn, 226
Wis. 83, 275 N.W 896 (1937). Note: The determination of whether or not
an anticipatory breach occured because of the demand for additional com-
pensation and threatened non- performance requires an analysis which pro-
ceeds independently from the question of modification. Ordinarily, no antici-
patory breach accompanies the request for additional compensation, since the
intention not to perform the original contract is held in abeyance pending the
outcome of the negotiations for modification. The statement of the intention
not to perform is conditioned on the refusal of the other party to allow a
modification.
18 See, Llewellyn, "Common-Law Reform of Consideration," for a presentation
of the doctrine of Undue-Unfairness.
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An evaluation of economic activities shows the need for legal en-
couragement of modification agreements which are instrumental in
maintaining productive conduct entered into by virtue of the original
contract as a preferable alternative to allowing cessation of such ac-
tivities and recourse to the courts.19 The Wisconsin rule that the con-
sideration from the original agreement is deemed imported into the
new contract operates in furtherance of that objective.
FRANK RouILLIE
29 "Wealth in a commercial age is made up largely of promises. An important
part of everyone's substance consists of advantages which others have prom-
ised to provide for or to render to him, of demands to have the advantages
promised which he may assert not against the world at large but against par-
ticular individuals. Thus the individual claims to have performance of ad-
vantageous promises secured to him. He claims satisfaction of expectations
created by promises and agreements. If this claim is not secured friction and
waste obviously result, and unless some countervailing interest must come into
account, which would be sacrificed in the process, it would seem that the in-
dividual interest in promised advantages should be secured to the full extent
of what has been assured to him by the deliberate promise of another." Pound,
p. 236.
1950]
